CASPER
THE FRIENDLY GHOST
Britain needs to negotiate with the Taliban, offering them money or immunity from prosecution in order to secure peace, according to a new counter-insurgency strategy
Soldiers from 2 Yorks running a vehicle checkpoint with Afghan Police with the hope of apprehending the rogue policeman responsible for the deaths of 5 soldiers last week in the Nad e'Ali district of Helmand province
Aimed at commanders and staff officers, it advises them on ways to win over the enemy and says they should not see negotiation as a sign of weakness. One of the enticements suggested for the Taliban is offering “conditional immunity from prosecution…without granting a general amnesty”
Another is using money to buy off “actively hostile and irreconcilable” insurgents as a “substitute for force.” Rewards can also be used to bribe villagers to help capture prominent insurgency figures.
It also suggests “local security accommodations” with groups of concerned local citizens which could involve stopping raids and releasing prisoners.
“It may even be possible to secure an area without force, through implementing economic and governance measures,” the strategy adds, such as curfews and check points.
Amid growing public scepticism of the British military mission in Afghanistan and calls for British troops to return home, the strategy suggests redefining what “victory” against the Taliban would mean because the enemy does not share our “legal or ethical framework” and does not subscribe to “traditional views of victory and defeat.”
“’Losing’ and especially ‘winning’ are less relevant notions,” it adds.
It suggests that “even when we do achieve military success, it may prove difficult to convince them [the enemy] and hence our own public that we have actually beaten them without ‘winning’ the population.”
Instead we should “characterise success as the realisation by enough of our adversaries of the futility of further violence, and popular rejection of their political vision.”
The document also says that setting a time limit for the withdrawal of troops could wreck the whole strategy because it risks “handing the initiative to the adversary by laying out the limits of our commitment, or to opportunists who benefit from the conflict.”
The problem, according to the authors, is that armies have a bias for “high-tempo,” operations to defeat the enemy and while such approaches are critical to success in war, they are counter-productive to stabilising a country
It adds: “It is better to modify behaviour by coercion than by using force. This needs a subtle combination of threats and incentives that allows the commander to retain control without losing the initiative or public support.”
The strategy recommends “going with the grain” to work with tribal structures, while also enabling the central government to “re-connect (or connect) with its people.”
Most worryingly for those already nervous about forces’ relationship with the Afghan police after the shooting earlier this month in which five British soldiers died, the document says that “international forces must live among the population and partner indigenous forces if they are to establish effective security and a policing function that serves the population.”
Describing how peace could be made with the Taliban, it says there will be “gulf of misunderstanding and misperceptions.”
“Setting definitive boundaries, therefore, such as whether or not the release of prisoners is contemplated, is likely to be counter-productive,” it adds.
The document admits that such a strategy is “highly sensitive” and that “commanders need to provide clear guidance on it to the force.”
It adds: “In any group there will be a spread of commitment, a mix of reconcilable and irreconcilable members.
“The aim is to distinguish between them; accommodate with the reconcilable, and kill, neutralise or isolate the irreconcilable, particularly the leadership element.”
Aimed at commanders and staff officers, it advises them on ways to win over the enemy and says they should not see negotiation as a sign of weakness. One of the enticements suggested for the Taliban is offering “conditional immunity from prosecution…without granting a general amnesty”
Another is using money to buy off “actively hostile and irreconcilable” insurgents as a “substitute for force.” Rewards can also be used to bribe villagers to help capture prominent insurgency figures.
It also suggests “local security accommodations” with groups of concerned local citizens which could involve stopping raids and releasing prisoners.
“It may even be possible to secure an area without force, through implementing economic and governance measures,” the strategy adds, such as curfews and check points.
Amid growing public scepticism of the British military mission in Afghanistan and calls for British troops to return home, the strategy suggests redefining what “victory” against the Taliban would mean because the enemy does not share our “legal or ethical framework” and does not subscribe to “traditional views of victory and defeat.”
“’Losing’ and especially ‘winning’ are less relevant notions,” it adds.
It suggests that “even when we do achieve military success, it may prove difficult to convince them [the enemy] and hence our own public that we have actually beaten them without ‘winning’ the population.”
Instead we should “characterise success as the realisation by enough of our adversaries of the futility of further violence, and popular rejection of their political vision.”
The document also says that setting a time limit for the withdrawal of troops could wreck the whole strategy because it risks “handing the initiative to the adversary by laying out the limits of our commitment, or to opportunists who benefit from the conflict.”
The problem, according to the authors, is that armies have a bias for “high-tempo,” operations to defeat the enemy and while such approaches are critical to success in war, they are counter-productive to stabilising a country
It adds: “It is better to modify behaviour by coercion than by using force. This needs a subtle combination of threats and incentives that allows the commander to retain control without losing the initiative or public support.”
The strategy recommends “going with the grain” to work with tribal structures, while also enabling the central government to “re-connect (or connect) with its people.”
Most worryingly for those already nervous about forces’ relationship with the Afghan police after the shooting earlier this month in which five British soldiers died, the document says that “international forces must live among the population and partner indigenous forces if they are to establish effective security and a policing function that serves the population.”
Describing how peace could be made with the Taliban, it says there will be “gulf of misunderstanding and misperceptions.”
“Setting definitive boundaries, therefore, such as whether or not the release of prisoners is contemplated, is likely to be counter-productive,” it adds.
The document admits that such a strategy is “highly sensitive” and that “commanders need to provide clear guidance on it to the force.”
It adds: “In any group there will be a spread of commitment, a mix of reconcilable and irreconcilable members.
“The aim is to distinguish between them; accommodate with the reconcilable, and kill, neutralise or isolate the irreconcilable, particularly the leadership element.”